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This decision makes the serving of notice upon the defendant a
mandatory procedure preceding prosecution for libel and places upon
the state prosecutor the burden for such notice and the allegation that
the notice has been served. The Court in so doing has filled the gap
in Florida libel law, thereby enabling the defendant to reduce or
mitigate by a proper retraction 34 the penalties evolving from inadvertent libel. This step was fairly to be anticipated in view of the ever35
growing need of modem society for the rapid dissemination of news
and the psychological value of retraction," but particularly in light
of the limited liability guaranteed the press by Section 836.08 of
Florida Statutes 1953:37 ".. . and if, in a criminal proceeding, a verdict
of 'guilty' is rendered on such a state of facts, the defendant shall be
fined one dollar and the costs, and no more."
LEwis H. HILL, III

CONTRACTS: INTENT TO BENEFIT A THIRD PARTY
United States v. Carpenter,113 F. Supp. 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1949)'
Defendant importer and a Canadian exporter executed a contract for the importation of potatoes into the United States. One
clause of the contract limited the resale of the potatoes to seed purposes. The Canadian Government required insertion of the clause
in pursuance of an executive agreement between the United States,
statutes illustrative of the trend, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254
(1951); Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 CoL. L. Rav. 521,
525 (1952); Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CoRNna.L L. Q. 261, 273 and n.67 (1950);
2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §§1930, 1934 (12th ed., Ruppenthal, 1932).
4
3 FLA. STAT. §770.02 (1953).

35Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
36See ROTHENBERG, Tin NEwspAPER 70 (1948).
37
1n order to be eligible, however, the defendant must meet the following requirements: "If it appears upon the trial that said article was published in good
faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake of the facts, and that there were
reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article were true, and
that within ten days after the service of said notice a full and fair correction,
apology and retraction was published in the same editions or corresponding issues
of the newspaper or periodical in which said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said original article ....
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which supports the price of table potatoes, and Canada. Plaintiff,
the United States, alleging that the imported potatoes were resold
for table use, sued for an injunction prohibiting future resales and
for damages. Defendant moved for an order dismissing the complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. HELD, the complaint alleged sufficient facts to enable the jury to find a contract made
for the benefit of the United States, which can maintain an action
as a third party beneficiary. Motion denied.
It is settled law that, when one person makes a promise to another
for the benefit of a third person, that third person may maintain an
action upon the promise.2 The right of action of the third person,
who need not be privy to the contract or to the consideration, has
traditionally been limited to cases in which the third person was
the party intended to be benefited by such a contract. 3 If the promisor
expressly agrees to render a performance to a third person, courts
experience no difficulty in finding a right of action in that third
person for breach of the promise. The courts, however, encounter
difficulty in the absence of express words showing the intention of
the parties. The existence of the requisite intent is a matter of construction of the contract,4 and it is sometimes said that the language
will be construed strictly against the one suing as a third party
beneficiary.5 Nevertheless, courts have struggled valiantly in many
cases to discover language in the contract supporting the claim of
the alleged third party beneficiary when the factual situation seemed
to demand it. This intent has been described in the cases variously
as an intention to confer a direct benefit;" an intention to confer a
benefit largely and primarily, even though not exclusively, for the
plaintiff;7 or an intention to recognize the third person as a primary
'Case reported in October of 1953.
2Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). This leading case established the right
of a third party beneficiary to maintain an action and has been followed in all
jurisdictions in the United States. English courts do not allow the action.
3Simpson v. Brown, 68 N.Y. 355 (1877).
4Sec Woodhead Lumber Co. v. E. G. Niemann Investments, Inc., 99 Cal. App.
456, 298 Pac. 913, 914 (1929).
5See Commissioner v. Keller, 59 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1932); Cannon Ball
Motor Freight Lines v. Grasso, 59 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
GRobins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); In re A. C. Becken
Co., 75 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1935); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252,
178 N.E. 498 (1931).
7Maumcc Vallcy Elcc. Co. v. Toledo, 13 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1926).
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party in interest." In an extreme expression of the doctrinally vital
intent, one court said that the cause of action depended "merely
upon the question of whether the third party has a beneficial interest
in the enforcement of the contract."9
The reasoning in the instant case reflects factors which give rise to
the aura of flexibility of the third party beneficiary doctrine. First the
court poses the question of whether the contract was intended to
benefit the plaintiff as being a question of fact for the jury. Next it
assumes that a trier of the facts made a finding that the export contracts were for the benefit of the United States. Finally, after assuming
the vital intent to benefit the plaintiff, the court states that a beneficiary of such agreements is entitled to maintain suit, citing five cases
to bolster this line of reasoning. Of these, three o held against the
alleged third party beneficiary after the court failed to find the
necessary intent in the contract. The remaining two 1 involved express contract clauses guaranteeing payment for property damage resulting from construction activity. Thus the court in the instant
case side-stepped the knotty intent question.
A review of the third party beneficiary cases reveals that, unless
the intent is not proved, 12 there is no objection to an action by the
United States as a third party beneficiary, in a proper case,', merely
because the plaintiff is the Government. 14 Nor does the fact that
the clause relied upon was included in the contract pursuant to the
command of a statute, 5 an executive order,' 6 or a state athletic
commission,'y mean that the plaintiff will be denied a remedy. In
such cases, courts have inferred the requisite intent. The obvious
fact that the parties to such a contract had no desire or motive to
Sin re Gubelman, 13 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1926).
9Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Ummach, 228 III. App. 67, 81 (1923).
loGerman Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220 (1912);
Constable v. National S.S. Co., 154 U.S. 51 (1894); In re United Cigar Stores Co., 70
F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1934).
"Coley v. Cohen, 289 N.Y. 365, 45 N.E.2d 913 (1942); Rigney v. New York Cent.
& H. R.R., 217 N.Y. 31, Il N.E. 226 (1916).
l2Standard Fruit and S.S. Co. v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 659 (1945).
l"United States v. Inorganics, 109 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1952).
4United States v. Insurance Co. of North America, 65 F. Supp. 401 (W.D.S.C.

1946).
1"Fata v. S. A. Healy Co., 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E.2d 339 (1943).
16United States ex tel. Johnson v. Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1938).
17McClare v. 'Massachusetts Bonding F, Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 371, 195 N.E. 15 (1935).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol7/iss1/11

4

Bullen: Contracts: Intent to Benefit a Third Party
CASE COMMENTS
benefit the third party has apparently caused little if any judicial
concern. Using similar reasoning, a sizable group of cases indicate
increasing use of a construction of the intent to afford a remedy to a
person who is not a contracting party. The benefit to the third party
which necessarily results from the performance of the contract is said
to be within the contemplation of the parties, and provides the constructive intent to benefit upon which the third party may base his
action.18 This circular reasoning is perhaps a manifestation of a
judicial desire to increase the availability of the remedy for reasons
founded upon financial equities 9 or promotion of industry20 or
21
public policy.
Despite facile manipulation of the intent-to-benefit doctrine as
demonstrated in many of the above cases, this test of the plaintiff's
right of action has not proved adequate. It is logically inconsistent to
argue that A is motivated by an intent to benefit his creditor C, when A
secures a promise from B that B will assume the duties of A to C. A's
motive is to be relieved of his obligation to C, and yet courts have
consistently construed from this situation an intent on the part of A
to benefit C. C may then sue on the contract between A and B. Despite
contrary motives of A, the granting of an additional right to C by
permitting him to sue B always results in a benefit to C. Faced with
the contradiction between terminology and facts, courts sometimes
have denied relief merely because of an inability to handle the facts
22
in terms of the language of the intent doctrine.
To resolve this logical and verbal hurdle and facilitate use of
the third party beneficiary remedy, a new method of analyzing the
plaintiff's claim was formalized in the Restatement of Contracts.2
This method involves categorization of third party beneficiaries into
three types: donee, creditor, and incidental. A person is a donee
beneficiary if the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise
IsCalder v. Richardson, 11 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.Fla. 1935); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v.
Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co., 234 Ky. 645, 29 S.W.2d 650 (1930); Durnherr v. Rau,
135 N.Y. 219, 32 N.E. 49 (1892); Lenz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 111 Wis. 198, 86 N.W.

607 (1901).
'ORodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371 (1947).
2OFidelity & Deposit Co. of Baltimore v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 262, 125 So. 55 (1929).
2
2See Note, Intent and Benefit in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts: A Justification for Public Policy, 26 VA. L. REv. 778 (1940).
22Constable v. National S.S. Co., 154 U.S. 51 (1894); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y.

280 2 (1877).

3RESrATEMENT,

CoNTRACTs §133 (1932).
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is to make a gift to or to confer a right upon the beneficiary.2 4 A
person is a creditor beneficiary if the performance of the promise will
satisfy an actual, supposed, or asserted duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary.25 A person is an incidental beneficiary if the benefits to
him are merely incidental to the performance of the promise and he
is neither of the other two types.2 6 A donee beneficiary or a creditor
beneficiary is afforded a remedy. An incidental beneficiary, however,
cannot recover under any circumstances.2 7 This new classification has
28
been tried in the courts and has proved acceptable.
Application of the Restatement test of a third party's right of
action to the facts of the instant case provides a new tool with which
to evaluate the court's judgment. First, which type of beneficiary is
the United States? Since the performance of the promise will not
satisfy a duty of the promisee Canadian exporter to the beneficiary
United States, plaintiff is not a creditor beneficiary. In addition, the
creditor beneficiary remedy is usually reserved for cases in which the
promisee owes a debt of money to the beneficiary that is paid by the
promisor in performance of the contract. 29 This, also, is not the
situation in the instant case. The United States, however, was not
considered an incidental beneficiary, since the motion to dismiss was
denied and the plaintiff was acknowledged to possess a cause of action.
Therefore, by process of elimination, the United States would have
been held a donee beneficiary had the court employed the Restatement language.
The above analysis of the facts of the instant case in terms of the
Restatement test is a realistic appraisal of the way in which that test
has been applied to third party beneficiary cases. Some writers, including judges, speak of the incidental beneficiary class as having
been intended as a catch-all classification; 30 others speak of the donee
beneficiary class as having been intended as a catch-all classification. 31
2

4See 22 TENN. L. RIv. 1060 (1953).
2512 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 295 (1951).
26d. at 296.
27
RFsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §147 (1982); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §779C (1951).
28Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1934); Byram Lumber
& Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 Ad. 293 (1929); Hendrix Mill & Lumber
Co. v. Meador, 228 Ky. 844, 16 S.W.2d 482 (1929); Marlboro Shirt Co., Inc. v.
American Dist. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951).
294 CORBIN, CONTRA=TS §787 (1951).
sOld. §779C.
3'Fuu.R, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 551 (1947).
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